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Recent Decisions
the state have been fully litigated in a prior federal forum, then a
subsequent state proceeding stemming from the same act constitutes
69
double jeopardy.
Because double jeopardy is the import of the Pennsylvania court's
analysis, it stands in apparent conflict with the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Bartkus. The Bartkus court neglected to consider
the interest of the individual, to which the Pennsylvania court has
given primary consideration under circumstances where the state's
interests have been satisfied in a prior federal proceeding. It is suggested that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court under the facts of Mills
has made an appropriate and necessary decision and, therefore, ought
to be followed by the highest court in the land. Therefore, the United
States Supreme Court ought to overrule Bartkus in order to permit
double jeopardy to serve as a defense to a state prosecution following
a federal prosecution where the state's interest has been sufficiently
vindicated. To maintain judicial consistency in decision making, the
Court ought to overrule Abbate v. United States70 and permit double
jeopardy to serve as a defense to a federal prosecution following a state
prosecution where the federal interest has been sufficiently vindicated.
C. Steven Miller
NoTE: Subsequent to the decision by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Mills, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted section III of the Crimes Code.71 The statute bars a
AUTHOR'S

69. Fifteen state jurisdictions have provided a statutory double jeopardy defense for
any person prosecuted in a state court after being tried in a federal court for the same
offense. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 3-4 (1972). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.10
(Prop. Offic.. Draft 1962).
70. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 111 (1973) states:
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this Commonwealth and of the United States or another state, a prosecution in any such
other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this Commonwealth under
the following circumstances: (1) The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in
a conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating to when prosecution
barred by former prosecution for same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is
based on the same conduct unless: (i) the offense of which the defendant was formerly
convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each
requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of such
offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil; or (ii) the
second offense was not consummated when the former trial began. (2) The former
prosecution was terminated, after the indictment was found, by an acquittal or by
a final order or judgment for the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed
or vacated and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established for conviction of the
offense of which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted.
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subsequent prosecution in Pennsylvania for crimes which have been
prosecuted in the federal or a state jurisdiction under two circumstances.
First, a second prosecution is a bar where the defendant is acquitted
or convicted in the first prosecution and the second prosecution is based
on the same conduct. Under this circumstance the statute provides for
two exceptions. First, a subsequent prosecution is permitted if proof of
the offense requires proof of a fact which was not required by the first
prosecution and proof of the offense in the first prosecution required
proof of a fact not required in the subsequent prosecution. Additionally, in order to fall within the first exception the law defining each' of
the offenses must prevent a substantially different harm or evil. The
second exception allowing a subsequent prosecution is applicable
when the commission of the second offense was not completed at the
time the first prosecution was commenced.
The second circumstance under which a second prosecution is
barred involves the situation where the first prosecution was terminated by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment. If such an
acquittal or final order or judgment has not been set aside, reversed
or vacated; and such acquittal, order or judgment required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be proven for conviction in
the subsequent prosecution, the subsequent prosecution is barred.
The statutory language is broader in scope than the Mills court
holding, since the statute bars a second prosecution following a prosecution in other state jurisdictions as well as the federal jurisdiction. The
statute appears to have specified the factors a court must consider in
determining the Mills court's test as to whether the state's interest in
prosecuting the accused has been sufficiently vindicated in the federal
or other state jurisdiction. The application of these'statutory factors
will be the subject of judicial interpretation as cases begin to arise.
Although the statute supersedes Commonwealth v. Mills as the law
of Pennsylvania, the case remains valuable in two respects. The case
may be cited as an example of a factual setting which served to bar a
state prosecution following a federal prosecution. More importantly,
the Mills case represents decisional law and may provide the impetus
for a United States Supreme Court decision overruling Bartkus v.
Illinois.7 2
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359 U.S. 121 (1959).

